Self-incrimination - by Trying on Hat -  Allen v. State by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 4
Self-incrimination - by Trying on Hat - Allen v. State
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Self-incrimination - by Trying on Hat - Allen v. State, 13 Md. L. Rev. 31 (1953)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol13/iss1/4
Casenotes
SELF-INCRIMINATION - BY TRYING ON HAT
Allen v. State1
In this case, defendant-appellant was convicted of
assault with intent to rape and was sentenced to death.
At the trial a state's witness has testified that a hat found
near the scene of the crime belonged to Allen. Accused
took the stand in his own behalf and denied ownership,
whereupon the prosecutor gave the hat to accused and
asked him to try it on. This was allowed by the trial court
over counsel's objection, which was the basis for the appeal.2
The Court of Appeals reversed, with a new trial.
In any discussion of the privilege of the rule it is neces-
sary to refer briefly to its common law history.3 Though
the federal and all but two of the constitutions have
embodied this privilege,' they do not change the common
law tenor or scope of it. This is evidenced by the minor
variations and the brevity of the clauses.5 The authors of
the constitution were merely recognizing a rule that already
existed, and not creating it anew.
The ecclesiastical courts, when examining causes over
which they had jurisdiction, and especially when interrogat-
ing heretics, administered to the accused the "oath ex
officio". The judges could then put the accused to answer
any questions whether relevant to the inquiry or not, and
a refusal to answer was tantamount to an admission of guilt.
The first popular antagonism toward these courts was
spurred because of the manner of calling any accused with-
out a formal presentment. This feeling came to embrace
the oath ex officio as an odious procedure also. Later when
the Court of Star Chamber and the Court of High Commis-
1183 Md. 603, 39 A. 2d 820,171 A. L. R. 1138 (1944).
' For a criticism of this case from the waiver aspect see Sherbow, T.,
Bel-Incriminatton and the Waiver Thereof, 10 Md. L. Rev. 158 (1949).
'For a thorough discussion of the history of the privilege see VIII
WIoMosz ox Evwmqcz (3rd Ed., 1940), Sec. 2250, p. 276.
' New Jersey and Iowa are the two exceptions and their courts have held
the rule is a part of the common law of those states. State v. Zdanowicz,
69 N. J. Law 619, 55 A. 743 (1903) ; State v. Height, 117 Ia. 650, 91 N. W.
935 (1902).
5U. S. Const. Amend. V, cl. 3: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." Md. Decl. of Rights, Art. 22:
"No man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a
criminal case."
I Wiemonz, op. *it., supra, n. 3, Sec. 225, p. 320.
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sion for Ecclesiastical Causes had assumed most of the
functions of the ecclesiastical courts, the feeling against
the oath reached a pitch. The common law courts were
vying with these courts for authority and helped bring
about their downfall. In 1641 when the Court of Star
Chamber and The Court of High Commission were abol-
ished the oath ex officio went with them. The antagonism
against the oath then spread to its use in the common law
courts. The reaction enlarged the rule so that it came to
be doubted that any person should be bound to incriminate
himself on any charge before any court. Many cases at
this time quote the maxim "nemo tenetur prodere
seipsum".7
It is seen then that the purpose of the rule was to pro-
hibit the court from extracting an admission of guilt from
the lips of the accused.
In the Allen case the court lays down a test to be used
in these borderline cases: ". . . Who furnished or produced
the evidence? If the accused, especially if in open court and
on the witness stand, is made to do so by performing an
act or experimentation which might aid in connecting him
with the crime and establishing his guilt, it is inadmissible".8
It is submitted that the rule is too broad to be practicable
as a working test. The rule as propounded would seriously
'hamper the workings of the prosecutors if any fact which
might aid in connecting accused with the crime were
excluded.
In this respect it is valuable to consider what other juris-
dictions have held in similar cases. It is not a violation
of the privilege to compel the accused to walk around so
that he may be identified by a witness9 or to stand up 0 or
to be pointed out from the witness stand." And it has been
held that accused can be compelled to exhibit a tattooed
arm12 or to put on a shirt found near the scene of the
crime."' So accused can be compelled within the limits
required by decency to exhibit his body to the jury, 4 and
7For an interesting theory as to the origin of this maxim see Corwin,
The Supreme Court's construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29
Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1930).
S uSpra, n. 1, 611.
State v. Clark, 156 Wash. 543, 287 Pac. 18 (1930).
10 People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003 (1894) ; People v. Curran,
286 191. 302, 121 N. E. 637 (1919) ; Benson v. State, 69 S. W. 165 (1902).
uState v. Johnson, 67 N. C. 55 (1872).
Is State v. Au Chuey, 14 Nev. 79 (1879).
'
8 State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926), commented on in 24
Mich. L. Rev. 617 (1926).
"State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506, 35 P. 382 (1893), aff'd. 164 U. 8. 705
(1896).
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to speak in court so he might be identified by a witness who
had encountered him in the dark.15  "Out of court as well
as in court, his body may be examined with or without
his consent".16
An accused may be compelled to take his feet from under
a chair and put them into full view so a witness can judge
their size,17 or to allow a witness to examine his face to
see if he has pock marks as did the culprit."' The court
may direct accused to remove his glasses" or a visor 2° or a
veil,21 so he might be better identified by a witness. There
is much dicta to the effect that if accused wore a mask or
veil the court could certainly require him to remove it.2
And the court may require accused to be shaved or have
hair trimmed. "It may hardly be gainsaid that a defendant
may be compelled to appear cleanly washed, suitably
dressed and with hair properly combed and brushed". 3
In a very recent Supreme Court case24 defendants' home
was entered and he was assaulted by officers who attempted
to remove some pellets of morphine from his mouth. The
officers took defendant to a hospital and directed a doctor
to "pump" his stomach. Among the vomited matter was
found the two pellets of morphine. Over defendant's ob-jection, the morphine was allowed as evidence and the
defendant was convicted of possession of morphine in viola-
tion of the California Health and Safety Code. This judg-
ment was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, and the
Supreme Court of California denied without opinion de-
fendant's petition for a hearing. On certiorari to the
Supreme Court, it reversed, all justices concurring. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority said the
fifth Amendment did not apply to trials in a state court,
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. St. 369,9 A. 78 (1887) (dictum).
"MacFarland v. U. S., 150 F. 2d 593, 594 (C. A., D. C., 1945), cert. den.
326 U. S. 788 (1946).
2, State v. Prudhomme, 25 La. Ann. 522 (1873).
State v. Butler, 157 La. 1087, 103 So. 332 (1925) - though accused's
counsel did not claim privilege against self-incrimination the court sustained
the district attorney in asking questions "evidently for purpose of forcing
an Identification of the accused".
IRutherford v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 530, 121 S. W. 2d 342 (1938).
People v. Clark, 18 Cal. 2d 449, 116 P. 2d 56 (1941).tmPeople v. Robinson, 2 Park Crim. (N. Y.) 235 (1855) - accused did not
object to lifting her veil and no error was contended for. The appellate
court did not comment on the matter.
0 People v. Gardner, supra, n. 10; State v. Tucker, 190 N. C. 708, 130 S. E.
720 (1925) ; State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646 (1876) ; and see People v. Straus,
174 Misc. 881, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 155 (1940) - that accused may be compelled
to remove any artificial covering or disguise.
People v. Straus, aupra, n. 22, 156.MRochin v. People of California, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952), ... U. S.
1953]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XIII
but the proceedings had violated the Due Process Clause.
"They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to
permit of constitutional differentiation." 5  Mr. Justice
Douglas in a concurring opinion said the standard estab-
lished for due process included the Fifth Amendment and
should be applied to state as well as federal trials. The
Supreme Court should prohibit a state court from com-
pelling a witness to testify against himself. "Of course an
accused can be compelled to be present at the trial, to
stand, to sit, to turn this way or that, and to try on a cap
or a coat... But I think that words taken from his lips,
capsules taken from his stomach, blood taken from his
veins are all inadmissible provided they are taken from
him without his consent."
2 6
The cases which involve repeating words heard at the
scene of crime and standing up for purposes of identification
doubtless are based on the theory that since the state has
a right to the presence of accused in court and since the
accused must stand and answer the indictment in proper
person, no rights of accused are violated by compelling him
to perform the same acts at some subsequent phase of the
trial. However, this view should be followed even if ac-
cused is required to perform some physical act such as
rolling up a sleeve, (or putting on a hat.) "No fears or
hopes of the prisoner could produce the resemblance of his
track to that found in the cornfield. This resemblance
was a fact calculated to aid the jury and fit for their
consideration." 28
Though there are a substantial number of cases contra,29
they represent the minority view. "The tendency of the
more modern cases is to restrict the . . . privilege . . . to
confessions and admissions proceeding from the accused. '30
The Proposed Model Code of Evidence takes the view
that "An accused in a criminal action has no privilege to
refuse to submit his body to examination by the judge or
0 Ibid," 210.
0 Ibid, 213, conc. op. (Emphasis supplied.)
" WTxos, op. cit., anpra, n.-3, Sec. 2265, p. 375.
0 State v. Graham, aupra, n. 22,647.
- Violative of privilege to (a) put on hat, Allen v. State, supra, n. 1; (b)
stand in court to enable jury to ascertain accused's status as a free Negro,
State v. Jacobs, 5 Jones (N. C.) 259 (1858) (since "distinguished" by several
cases) ; (c) show an amputated leg, Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76 (1881) ;
(d) put foot in a pan of mud placed before the Jury and compare the track
with measurements of one found at scene of crime, Stokes v. State, 5 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 619 (1875), Elder v. State, 143 Ga. 363, 85 S. E. 97 (1915) ; (e) put
on.coat found near scene of crime, Ward v. State, 27 Okl. Cr. 362, 228 Pac.
498 (1924).
SOases collected 64 A. L. I. 1097, also 171 A. L. . 1144.
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trier of fact or to refuse to do any act in their presence
other than to testify."'" Bearing in mind the scope and
purpose of the privilege at common law, the stand taken
by the Model Code is in line. The purpose of the rule was
to forbid the extraction of incriminatory evidence from the
lips of the accused by testimonial compulsion. The broad-
ening of the scope of the rule so as to include all the other
facets of nontestimonial compulsion is, says Dean Wigmore,
an example of "Justice tampered with mercy."
There have been forceful arguments for the abolition
of the rule on the ground that it has outlived its useful-
ness. 2 Wigmore says its retention is justified because "any
system of administration which permits the prosecution to
trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source
of proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination
develops... to be satisfied with an incomplete investiga-
tion of the other sources."' 3
The report of an Indian police officer illustrates the
truth of that statement. "It is far pleasanter to sit com-
fortably in the shade, rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's
eyes, than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence." 4
However the privilege should not be given more than
its due significance. It should be accepted rationally, not
worshipped blindly as a fetish. We should not merely em-
phasize its benefits, but concede its shortcomings and guard
against its abuses. The common judicial practice of "....
treating with warm and fostering respect every appeal to
this privilege, and of amiably feigning each guilty invoca-
tor to be an unsullied victim hounded by the persecutions
of a tyrant, is a mark of traditional sentimentality."3 5 The
evil inherent in the rule should be regretted, not enlarged
by judicial approval.
The majority of the foregoing cases are those in which
the privilege was claimed because accused was compelled
to perform some act in the courtroom. Often there is an
appeal to the privilege by an accused who has been com-
pelled by the arresting officers to perform some act which
would aid in his identification as the culprit.36
" MODEL CODE or EvIDNcE or A. L. I., Rule 201 (2).
2 BENTHAM, RATIONALE oF JUDICIAL EvioDc, 7 Bentham's Works (Bow-
ring's Ed.), p. 452.
" WIMoRE, op. cit., 8upra, n. 3, See. 2251, p. 309.
" I STEPHEN, HxSTOR OF THE CRMINAL LAw oF ENGLAND (1883), 442,
n. 1.
SWIGMOnR, op. cit., supra, n. 3, Sec. 2251, p. 317.
- For a justification of this view see 5 Temple L. Q. 368 (1931).
19531
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The marked weight of authority is that compelling ac-
cused to try on a garment and appear before a witness
(in jail) wearing the apparel so he could ascertain whether
accused is the same person he had seen wearing such gar-
ments, is not a violation of the privilege."
In one of the leading cases38 a witness had testified that
defendant had tried on a blouse found near the scene of
the crime (and it fitted him). Defendant claimed his priv-
ilege against self incrimination had been violated. Holmes,
J., speaking for the court said, "Another objection is based
on an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment...
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material."3 Holmes' and Wigmore's views are in
substantial agreement and they have met with wide ap-
proval. The theory of the Holt case is that the privilege
does not extend to physical facts such as size of accused
but only to testimonial utterances.
The Oklahoma court"0 distinguishes the two situations
thus, ". . . when such comparisons and experiments are
made outside, of court, the evidence thereto falls from the
lips of a witness other than the defendant. The production
of such evidence, therefore, and the testimony thereto, is
not that of defendant but of other witnesses;....41
In two cases since the Allen case the Court of Appeals
has also drawn the distinction. Both cases involved blood
grouping tests. In the first of these42 blood was taken from
the coat of the accused and examined by a toxicologist who
later testified in court as to what type it was. Held: this
does not violate privilege because accused did not testify.
w 18 A. L. R. 2d 796 - cases collected.
:Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245 (1910).
Ibid, 252-3. Case contra: Boyers v. State, 198 Ga. 838, 33 S. E. 2d 251
(1945). -
' Ward v. State, aupra, n. 29, 500.
"Accord: Arresting officers may require defendant to put on a cap for
identification purposes, Crenshaw v. State, 225 Ala. 346, 142 So. 669 (1932) ;
officers put-hat on head of accused in jail, Barrett v. State, 190 Tenn. 36,
229 S. W. 2d 516, 18 A. L. R. 2d 789 (1950) ; compelling accused to make
footprints and comparing them with prints found near the scene of the
crime, State v. Barela, 23 N. M. 395, 168 P. 545 (1922) ; Pitts v. State, 60
Tex. Cr. Rep. 524, 132 S. W. 801 (1910) ; Hahn v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. Rep.
409, 165 S. W. 218 (1914) ; sheriff took shoes of accused by force, Younger
v. State, 80 Neb. 201, 114 N. W. 170 (1907). See 28 Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 261 (1937-8), where Prof. Inbau says courts could rest
their opinion on the theory that everything of evidential value to person of
accused may be seized.
Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A. 2d 85 (1945).
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"The blood was taken from his coat, and the evidence as to
it was produced by another witness.
' 48
The later case' involved the same facts. The court held
the evidence about the blood was admissible. Commenting
on the Allen case, they said it draws a line of "demarcation
between cases where accused was compelled to allow a
physical exhibition while on the witness stand, and those
where the physical evidence, obtained from him, was testi-
fied to by other witnesses."45
WHERE PRINCIPLES OF RESTITUTION ARE
INAPPLICABLE TO ENCROACHMENT BY
BUILDING ON ADJOINING LAND
Easter v. Dundalk Holding Co.'
This suit was entered in the Circuit Court of Baltimore
City by the complainant, the Dundalk Holding Co., to
restrain the defendant, Andrew J. Easter, an adjoining
property owner, from enforcing a judgment obtained in an
ejectment suit, to assess the value of the strip of land occu-
pied by the complainant, and to order defendant to convey
the strip to the complainant. In 1945 the defendant, who
was then the owner of a large undeveloped tract of land on
Belair Road, sold a frontage of 250 feet to the complainant.
The latter erected a moving picture theater, the southwest
wall of which, by innocent mistake, encroached on the
defendant's land from .36 to .95 of a foot. This theater wall
was 13 inches thick, made of bricks and cinder blocks; the
roof was constructed of steel beams and gypsum steel
planks; and the ceiling of metal lathe and plaster. The
defendant apparently was not made aware of the encroach-
ment until after the progress of the work had caused some
of the top soil on his own land to be cut away. In 1947 the
defendant had filed suit in ejectment in the Superior Court
of Baltimore City, and in 1949 the Court had rendered
judgment in his favor. This judgment had been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals in 1950.2 Thereupon the com-
plainant filed the bill in equity cited above, alleging that
the value of the strip occupied was only $150, whereas
"Ibid, 444.
" Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57 A. 2d 289 (1948).
" Ibid, 645.
'86 A. 2d 404 (1952).
2 Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 73 A. 2d 877 (1950).
